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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT MYERS and 
JACKIE MYERS, his 
wife, 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants,) 
) 
) Case No. 17046 
REGGIE MC DONALD, 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a wrongful death action brought against 
Reggie McDonald for the death of Bobby Charles Menzies 
resulting from an automobile accident on November 22, 1976. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the limitation 
period found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28 was heard on March 13, 
1980, and an Order granting such motion was entered on March 31, 
1980. Plaintiffs appeal from that Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Robert and Jackie Myers were appointed guardians and 
given custody of Bobbie Charles Menzies, a minor and natural 
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brother of Jackie Myers, on January 15, 1976 by Order of 
Judge John Farr Larson of the Salt Lake County Juvenile Court. 
On November 21, 1976, Bobbie left home with some friends, 
never to return. Jackie called the police and reported Bobbie 
as a runaway. On November 22, 1976, Bobbie was killed in an 
automobile accident, but was identified by Reggie McDonald, 
driver of the accident vehicle, only as "Joey". "Joey" was 
described by police and newspaper accounts as having physical 
characteristics totally different from those Bobbie possessed. 
Jackie Myers requested that the local morgues be checked by 
the police, but her request was refused. The mysterious "Joey" 
was buried without ever having been identified. Finally, 
Robert Myers requested permission to try and identify photo-
graphs of the mysterious "Joey". On or about July 24, 1979, the 
Myers' positively identified "Joey" as Jackie's brother and 
their ward, Bobbie Charles Menzies. 
This action for wrongful death was commenced against 
Reggie McDonald on October 29, 1979. The action was dismissed 
by the district court on March 31, 1980 upon the ground that 
the action had not been connnenced within two years from the 
date of death. 
ISSUE 
Whether the limitation period provided by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-28 was properly applied by the district court. 
-2-
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ne 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION DID 
NOT ACCRUE UNTIL THE IDENTITY OF 
THE DECEDENT WAS KNOWN 
As the affidavit of plaintiff-appellant, Jackie 
Myers, indicates, the identity of Bobbie Charles Menzies 
was not discovered by the Myers until almost three years 
after his death, despite diligent efforts on their part. 
When Bobbie's identity and the fact of his death was finally 
revealed, the Myers became aware of the circumstances which 
led to his death. Those facts and circumstances indicate 
both intoxication and willful misconduct on the part of 
defendant and are the subject matter of this litigation. 
It is undisputed that from November 22, 1976 until 
July 24, 1979 no action was filed, and that such time period 
exceeded the two year limitation period provided by the statute. 
Under the circumstances, it cannot, however, be said that the 
plaintiff's cause of action "accrued" until the plaintiffs knew 
or should have known that Bobbie was in fact dead and of the 
circumstances surrounding his death, 
This court, in Platz v. International Smelting Co., 
61 Utah 342, 213 P. 187 (1922), addressed the former wrongful 
death statute with respect to whether a cause of action accrues 
at the time of death or at the time an administrator is appointed 
-3-
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for the decedent's estate. The court held under the circum-
stances of that case that the cause accrued at the time of 
death. It is clear that the issue presented here was not 
before the court in Platz. However, in that case the court 
quoted with approval the following language from the opinion 
in Collier v. Goessling, 160 F. 604, 611 (1908). 
To start the running of a statute of 
limitations, there must be some one 
capable of suing, some one subject 
to be sued, and a tribunal open for 
such suits. 213 P. at 188. 
Such reasoning has clear application to the present action. 
The Myers' could not have brought an action against this 
defendant until the fact and circumstances of Bobbie's death 
were known. There was no death certificate in existence 
bearing the name of Bobbie Charles Menzies until after July 24, 
1979. 
To say that the limitation period found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-28 ran before the Myers knew or should have known 
that Bobbie was dead defies logic. This court, in its recent 
holding in Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), 
addressed the question of discoverability of medical negligence 
in malpractice actions as affecting the date of accrual of a 
cause of action for statute of limitation purposes. This court 
quite properly held that "the law ought not to be construed to 
destroy a right of action before a person even becomes aware 
of the existence of that right." 601 P.2d at 147. The court 
-4-
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quoted with approval the Oregon Supreme Court's reasoning 
in Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, .421 P. 2d 966, 988 (1966) : 
To say ·that a cause of action accrues to 
a person when she may maintain an action 
thereon and, at the same time, that it 
accrues before she has or can reasonably 
be expected to have knowledge of any 
wrong inflicted upon her is patently 
inconsistent and unrealistic. She 
cannot maintain an action before she knows 
she has one. To say to one who has been 
wronged, 'You had a remedy, but before 
the wrong was ascertainable to you, the 
law stripped you of your remedy,' makes 
a mockery of the law. 601 P.2d-at 148, 149. 
This court need not view the Platz decision as rejecting 
the foregoing reasoning and argument. That decision does not deal 
with discovery or discoverability as affecting accrual of a 
cause of action. That decision assumes that when a person 
4, dies, his or her heirs or personal representatives are immediately 
:e 
aware of it. Obviously, when the fact of death is not known, 
nothing can be done about it until the fact and circumstances 
of death are known. An heir or representative can only commence 
action when those facts are known. Otherwise, there is no one 
to sue, nor any facts to allege as constituting a cause of action. 
To follow the district court's reasoning, a plaintiff 
in the Myers' position would be required to file an action within 
two years against an unknown person, claiming a death they were 
not certain had occurred, under circumstances of which they were 
not aware. The fallacy and futility of requiring the filing of 
such actions does not require comment. 
-5-
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POINT II 
THE UTAH LIMITATION OF WRONGFUL 
DEATH ACTIONS IS A LIMITATION 
NOT UPON THE RIGHT OF ACTION 
BUT ONLY UPON THE REMEDY 
This court has consistently held that the limita-
tion period imposed upon wrongful death causes of action in 
Utah is a limitation upon the remedy and not upon the right 
of action for wrongful death. Platz v. International Smelting 
Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 P. 187 (1922); Seely v, Cowley, 12 Utah 
2d 252, 365 P.2d 63 (1961); Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 
(Utah 1980) . 
Limitations imposed upon the remedy are legally 
considered to be "general" as opposed to "special" statutes 
of limitations. Special statutes of limitation apply to 
causes of action which did not exist at comm.on law but were 
created by the statute containing the limitation period. 
General statutes of limitation are subject to tolling provisions 
such as minority, absence of the defendant from jurisdiction, 
incarceration, etc., whereas special statutes of limitation 
are not. (See those cases cited immediately above.) 
The district court in its memorandum decision 
acknowledges that the limitation in wrongful death cases 
affects the remedy rather than the right. "The statute of 
limitations in wrongful death cases bars the remedy (Seely v. 
Cowley, 12 U. 2d 252, 365 P~2d 63) ." 
-6-
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The district court considered this court's recent 
decision in Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) wherein 
the court held that a cause of action for medical malpractice 
"accrues" when the plaintiff knows or should know of the facts 
constituting a cause of action and not before. This court in 
Foil has determined that the limitation period in medical 
malpractice actions is a general statute of limitations 
since causes of action for medical negligence were not created 
by statute but existed at common law. 
This court in Switzer, Id., as well as the earlier 
cases cited dealing with wrongful death statutes of limitation, 
has held that statutes of limitation in such cases in Utah 
are general and not special statutes of limitation for the 
same reason. Both must therefore be considered as tolled by 
the same tolling factors, and accrual of a cause of action in 
either medical negligence or wrongful death cases must be 
in1 considered to. occur when the plaintiff knows or should know 
of his right of action. Foil is determinative of the question 
presented by this appeal in view of this court's prior decisions 
in Platz, Switzer and Seely. 
POINT III 
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES ALLOW THIS 
ACTION TO SURVIVE AND ESTOP THE 
DEFENDANT FROM PLEADING THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS 
In Jackie Myers' affidavit (paragraph No. 9), it 
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is stated that Reggie McDonald, the defendant-respondent, gave_ 
the name of "Joey" to police as the name of the deceased individua 
who proved to be Bobbie Charles Menzies. There is no indication 
that the defendant did not know Bobbie's real name. Circum-
stances exist which raise the genuine possibility that McDonald 
intentionally concealed Bobbie's true identity. Should that be 
the case, Utah case law clearly tolls the limitation period for 
such concealment; ~' Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 
1974). The Meyers are, at the very least, entitled to further 
proceedings for the purpose of presenting such evidence to the 
trier of fact. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' cause of action must be considered to 
have accrued when, in the exerc:t.se of due diligence, they 
became aware of the fact and circumstances of the death of 
Bobbie Charles Menzies! That occurred on July 24, 1979, 
more than two years after the accident. This action was 
connnenced October 29, 1979, or three months after plaintiffs' 
cause of action accured. This court has held in Foil that it 
is the date of the legal wrong upon which the applicable statute 
of limitations begins to run in cases where, as here, the 
limitation affects the remedy and not the right. The district 
court's dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is error 
-8-
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and should be reversed, and the matter remanded to that court 
'for further proceedings consistent with this courtts opinion. 
DATED this 9th day of July, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~THONY M. THURBER <:::::::: 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
211 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-0181 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants were personally served upon 
Nelson L. Hayes of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, attorneys 
for defendant-respondent, 48 Post Office Place, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 this 10th day of July, 1980. 
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